Bangladesh Islamists could Inspire Radicalization in Southeast Asia Upending Jemaah Islamiyah’s Decision to Disband
Southeast Asia’s most significant and influential Salafi-jihadist group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) known for the 2002 Bali bombings, declared it was disbanding recently.This decision was announced by 16 senior members of the group, who stated their intention to shift towards creating a new education-focused entity. JI Spiritual leader Thoriqudin (alias Abu Rusydan) declared on video that he and the other leaders were dissolving the current structure and “returning to the lap of the Republic of Indonesia.”
To demonstrate its commitment, JI surrendered its caches of weapons and provided the authorities with a list of members of the militant wing as well as the names of members who had trained in Syria.
As part of that effort, they would work with the Indonesian Ministry of Religion to revise the curriculum at their 60 schools to eliminate extremism and conform to the national curricular standards.
During the conflict in the Middle East and the height of ISIS, JI members went in large numbers to train with the Free Syrian Army, Jabhat an-Nusra, Ahrar as-Sham, Suquour al Izz, and Hayat Tahrir al Shams. Eventually, JI set up its own training camp for its members near Salma, Syria. This resulted in a massive crackdown by Indonesian police. It is during this period, with JI’s top leaders in prison, that dialogue between key JI leaders both in and out of prison and a select group of Densus 88 officers (Counterterrorism Special Detachment 88, or Densus 88, is an Indonesian National Police counter-terrorism squad) began about the future of JI. These discussions ultimately resulted in the decision this summer to dissolve the organisation and its structure, with JI retaining control of its schools.
Jemaah Islamiyah, a multi-generational jihadi community bound by familial ties, marriages, friendship, shared experiences, mentor-protégé ties, and business relationships has chosen to sacrifice the organisation to ensure the survival of their community. JI has prioritised the community over the organisation and strives toward an Islamic society and state through political, economic, and societal mechanisms, no longer through radical means. This decision to disband was the culmination of a 16-year process of reconsidering tactics and strategies that began with a revision of perspective on the use of violence. According to the Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), a non-profit organisation based in Jakarta, “JI could not hope to survive without the support of the [Indonesian Muslim] community and there was clearly no support for violence.”
According to Alif Satria, an associate research fellow with the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), JI issued a fatwa supporting participating in peaceful demonstrations as “jihad through words.” For an organisation that traditionally associated jihad (struggle) with qital (battle), jihad through words was a novel concept. Moreover, JI permitted its members to vote in the 2019 presidential elections, confirming the political direction JI had already embarked upon.
One senior Jemaah Islamiyah leader shared an ideological justification behind the decision to reconcile with the state and dissolve: “We came to the realisation we cannot make war with the state and we’ve been coming to that realisation for some time…. There was broad agreement between Para Wijayanto, the JI ulama and JI intellectuals that the government and the state were not kafir (infidel) or thoghut (unIslamic). Therefore, they cannot be the enemy.”
Densus 88 and the Ministry of Religious Affairs are doing their part to help JI members reintegrate back into society to ensure that former members and their children can be accepted by broader Indonesian Muslim society.
The disbandment of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) can have several implications for regional security. Crucially it could lead to a decrease in the immediate threat of terrorist activities in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
But there is a risk that former members might form splinter groups or join other extremist organisations in Bangladesh which is undergoing an ominous resurgence of radical Islamism, including systematic attacks on religious minorities. These smaller groups can be more difficult to track and may continue to pose a security threat.
With JI’s shift towards educational activities, there might be a reduction in recruitment and radicalization efforts. However, elements from radical organisations in Bangladesh like the groups like Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) and Neo-JMB that are influenced by global jihadist movements like Al-Qaeda and ISISi, may continue efforts to recruit through propagation of extremist ideologies, especially in targeted at disgruntled former cadres of JI in Indonesia. It is possible that under the influence of Bangldeshi Islamists, a splinter group might emerge in the future.
It must be appreciated that relentless counter-terrorism operations led by Southeast Asian governments, particularly Indonesia, played a pivotal role in JI’s downfall. Similar action against radical Islamists was undertaken in Bangladesh by the former Sheikh Hasina government. Hasina, during her over 15-year reign, gave Bangladesh political stability and impressive economic growth, However the policies of the current Interim government have led to a clear resurgence of extremist tendencies in Bangladesh. With the overthrow of the 76-year-old “Iron Lady,” the Islamists have returned with a vengeance, resulting in widespread attacks on the country’s long-persecuted and dwindling Hindu minority.
As manifested through the Holey Artisan café terrorist attack in July 2016, Islamic extremism is a threat to Bangladesh. In addition, violent extremist organisations continue to recruit and to carry out attacks. Hasina’s secular government had cracked down on such violent religious groups. But amid the protests, mobs broke into prisons and freed hundreds of radical Islamists and terrorists, including those wanted in India for terror activity.
Today, the military-picked interim civilian-led regime is struggling to restore the rule of law and revive an economy battered by large-scale mob violence and destruction. The Islamist resurgence poses a serious law-and-order challenge in Bangladesh. If the Islamists continue to dictate affairs in Bangladesh, the result will be a broken economy and dysfunctional politics engendering violence, including Islamist extremism and cross-border terrorism.
The recent ouster of secular Sheikh Hasina and installation of pro-Islamist Muhammad Yunus as head of the interim government has the potential to embolden extremists in Indonesia and broader Southeast Asia.
Evidence suggests a trend of radicalization among Bangladeshis abroad that has had domestic consequences. Two of the Holey Artisan attackers had been radicalised during their study at the Malaysia campus of Monash University. In 2016, a Singapore court sentenced four Bangladeshis to between 24 and 60 months in jail for plotting “to finance terror attacks in Bangladesh.” In June 2018, Australian police brought terrorism charges against Bangladeshi-Australian Nowroz Amin, who was convicted of planning to return to Bangladesh to carry out terror attacks. In addition, numerous Bangladeshi workers in Singapore have been deported for supporting jihadist ideologies and plotting attacks in Bangladesh. In Australia in 2018, a 24-year-old Bangladeshi woman, apparently inspired by ISIS, stabbed an Australian man.
Islamist’s achievement in Bangladesh could inspire radicalization in Southeast Asia, encourage aspiring militants to travel to Bangladesh for training; revive local Violent extremist organisations (VEOs); and embolden transnational VEOs’ recruitment efforts in Bangladesh.
Overall, while the disbandment of JI is a positive step, it requires continued vigilance and comprehensive strategies to ensure long-term regional security. The danger comes from neighbouring Bangladesh, where Islamist political organisations that espouse illiberal ideologies have been on a high since the overthrow of Hasina. And VEOs continue to operate, recruit, and carry out small-scale attacks while aspiring to perpetrate greater violence.